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 Undercurrents of Violence: 
 Why Sierra Leone’s Political 
 Settlement is not Working 
A successful political settlement in 
Sierra Leone? 
In post-conflict contexts, political settlements are 
viewed as instrumental in establishing security and 
stability. Political settlements are ongoing political 
processes, which can emerge from one-off events, 
such as elite pacts and peace agreements; but they 
can also take the form of dynamic and fluid 
processes of bargaining, negotiation and 
compromises between elites that shape the nature 
of the post-conflict state.
Peacebuilding experts and practitioners consider 
that elite alliances and coalitions, and processes of 
bargaining and compromise between them, are 
more stable and less violence-prone if former 
rebels and contending political elites also have 
access to national wealth and power. In the case 
of Sierra Leone, the question of the governance 
and ownership of natural resources, especially 
diamonds, was a major factor in the sharing of 
wealth between contending elites. 
Sierra Leone’s current political settlement is 
highly influenced by the externally imposed peace 
agreement that ended the civil war in 2001. 
Prior to this, there had been several unsuccessful 
attempts at establishing a new political 
settlement between the country’s various elites. 
Following the attacks by Revolutionary United 
Front (RUF) soldiers on UN peacekeeping forces 
in May 2000, British troops were sent in to 
stabilise the situation. Sierra Leone became a 
de facto UN protectorate. 
As a result, the political settlement in Sierra 
Leone was essentially driven by a donor agenda 
led by the United Kingdom. This agenda focused 
on two key areas. One was security and justice, 
and was dealt with by the setting up of the 
Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration 
(DDR) programme, the Security Sector Reform 
programme, the Special Court for Sierra Leone, 
and the Truth and Reconciliation programme. The 
second was political and governance reforms, 
namely decentralisation, including the restoration 
of both local councils and the institution of 
chieftaincy, with the aim of tackling the root 
causes of the war. Donors believed that the 
country’s instability was due to a broken 
governance pact where society on the fringes 
(both geographical and political) was marginalised, 
and decentralisation would therefore give more 
power to the margins. Any new political 
settlement had to address this alienation of the 
countryside by the centre. 
Although political analysts now view the country 
as more stable, most researchers argue that the 
root grievances of the civil war have not actually 
been addressed. While new elite coalitions, 
including the international community, have 
helped to stabilise the country, the development 
outcome, and in particular the revenues raised 
through the natural resources extractive 
www.ids.ac.uk
Po
lic
y B
R
IE
FI
N
G
 
ISSUE 48 • JANUARY 2014
Debates over violence, security, humanitarian and development imperatives have 
long been polarised. However, as seen in Syria and Mali, the question is not 
simply whether one should intervene but rather how and for whose benefit. In 
this context, a closer look at the case of Sierra Leone – touted in many circles 
as a success story – yields interesting insights into the limits of its political 
settlement. Pro-poor development outcomes need to be at the heart of any 
negotiated political settlement. Failure to address fundamental issues around 
access to power, accountability regarding control of natural resources, and 
extreme poverty itself has resulted in marginalisation and disenfranchisement, 
and new forms of violence. 
economy, has benefited only a few. In fact, the 
new political system does relatively little to 
tackle the predatory and highly unequal 
political economy that existed before the war 
and that contributed to the outbreak of 
widespread violence. 
Stability: for whom and for how long? 
In Sierra Leone, the political settlement is 
structured around, and reflective of, the 
interests of a range of dominant groups, both 
domestic and international. These include 
leaders of political organisations, traditional 
chiefs, and the upper echelons of international 
peacebuilding missions and donor agencies. 
However, this stability has come at a price. 
Donor-driven governance reforms have failed 
to alter the political and economic structures 
of power. 
On the economic side, Sierra Leone remains 
one of the poorest and least developed countries 
in the world. In the decade after the civil war, 
it remained in the bottom 10 of the 180+ 
countries on the Human Development Index, a 
measure of people’s freedoms and their 
standard of living, focusing on health and levels 
of education. Over the past two years, it has 
moved up three places, thanks to an increase in 
GDP, the result of royalties from the mining of 
the country’s natural resources: diamonds, iron 
ore, rutile, bauxite and gold. Yet, despite this 
improvement and a GDP growth of 35.9% in 
2012, only a narrow elite has benefited. Wealth 
has failed to ‘trickle down’ to ordinary citizens. 
The lack of transparency around national 
resources revenue and the absence of any 
robust government oversight of how those 
revenues are spent led this year to the suspension 
of Sierra Leone from the Extractive Industries 
Transparency Initiative (EITI).
On the political side, decentralisation was not 
as transformative as donors had hoped, and it 
did not meet their goal of diffusing power 
among the elites. In fact, decentralisation 
became an instrument of power for central 
government rather than an institution 
accountable and responsive to the local 
population. The political landscape has barely 
changed, with the leadership of both major 
political parties, the Sierra Leone People’s Party 
(SLPP) and the All Peoples Congress (APC), 
remaining the same. For example, it is quite 
revealing that 12 years after the end of the civil 
war, the SLPP’s candidate for the 2012 
presidential elections, Maada Bio, was the 
military leader who launched a palace coup in 
1996 against Valentine Strasser. 
More fundamentally, the reconciliation and 
healing process was not undertaken at the 
community level. There are still tensions 
between local communities and ex-
combatants. The Truth and Reconciliation 
Commission lacked strong political support and 
none of the recommendations from the 
Commission’s report was taken up. Little effort 
has been made to address the lingering 
animosity between ex-combatants and those 
who suffered during 11 years of war. Ostracised 
from their communities, many former 
combatants have once again been pushed to 
the margins. 
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“The international 
community’s 
emphasis on
 ‘security first’ 
has come at 
the expense of 
broadening access 
to economic 
opportunities and 
basic services.”
UN Peacekeeping 
soldiers stand at 
ease during a 
ceremony marking 
both UN day and 
the imminent end 
of the United 
Nations Mission in 
Sierra Leone in 
December 2005.
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“Persistent 
inequalities 
and lack of 
opportunities 
are leading to 
frustration and 
increased, new 
forms of violence 
by marginalised 
groups such as 
ex-combatants 
or youth.”
The international community’s emphasis on 
‘security first’ after the end of the country’s civil 
war has come at the expense of broadening 
access to economic opportunities and basic 
services, leaving the poorest members of society 
in the same position they were in previously, 
and putting the country at risk of the same 
grievances that led to violence.
Inequalities, frustration and new 
forms of violence: the prospect for 
durable peace?
Persistent inequalities and lack of opportunities 
are leading to frustration and increased, new 
forms of violence by marginalised groups such 
as ex-combatants or youth.
New forms of urban violence, especially in the 
eastern and central parts of Freetown, have 
been developing and are linked to competion 
between popular musicians and a new 
gang-war culture. In April 2013, fan clubs of 
two rival music labels clashed in Freetown, 
using stones, bottles, knives and sharpened 
sticks. In universities and colleges (such as 
Fourah Bay College or the Milton Margai 
College of Education and Technology), violence 
sometimes erupts as a result of political 
divisions between fraternities and sororities, 
‘black man’ and ‘white man’ (where ‘black’ 
represents the ruling APC party while ‘white’ 
represents the opposition SLPP). 
In rural areas, the key issues relate to the non-
mining benefits that local communities gain 
from mining development. In the Tonkolili 
District, violent protests erupted in 2012 when 
miners downed tools in protest at poor pay 
and working conditions in the mines. Local 
residents joined the miners in demonstrations, 
which led to one person being killed and 
several others being severely injured. Similar 
incidents have taken place in Tongo Fields, 
Lunsar and Makeni where iron ore and other 
minerals are mined. 
It is true that resentment and low-intensity 
forms of violence are widespread in many 
countries, and do not necessarily herald the 
outset of civil strife. Furthermore, Liberia, 
which played a key part in the onset of the 
civil war in Sierra Leone, is relatively stable 
now. However, the prospect for durable 
peace in Sierra Leone is uncertain for two 
reasons:  first, the very divisive and conflictual 
nature of Sierra Leone politics involving the 
two major parties and the ‘dormant’ (but still 
armed) combatants who could be mobilised 
by these political parties. Second, illicit small 
arms and light weapons, made by artisan 
blacksmiths, are widely available to ex-
combatants and officially disbanded militia 
groups. 
Sierra Leone’s winner-takes-all style of politics 
has been highlighted by the UN as one of the 
biggest risks to stability in the country. Up to 
now, it has been mediated largely by the 
international community but it is unclear 
whether the government can maintain this 
stability without the support of the 
international community, especially given that 
both sides could mobilise their own groups of 
ex-combatants.
Members of the 
group ‘X-taci’ and 
friends – A new 
musical genre 
combining rap, 
Hip-Hop rhythms 
and protest lyrics 
has emerged in 
Sierra Leone 
following the brutal 
10 year civil war.
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Policy recommendations
The way in which elite-coalition political settlements are shaping patterns and 
processes of economic development is central to developing an understanding about 
building peaceful states and societies. This is not a question of trade-off between 
peaceful states (traditional security concerns) and peaceful societies (human security 
concerns) but rather of the extent to which negotiated political settlement will 
enable state–society relations to evolve into an acceptable and sustainable solution 
both for the elites and for society. 
Considering that there is always a real possibility of relapse into, or the continuation 
of, violence in other forms after the end of an internal armed conflict, violence-
mitigation efforts should focus on adopting a longer-term approach to transforming 
the political settlement into pro-development state–society relations, geared 
towards implementing far-reaching governance and other political and socio-
economic reforms. This will necessarily be a gradual, difficult and open-ended 
process, which is contingent on the capacity and willingness of dominant domestic 
elites and their international partners to advance it. However, the case of Sierra 
Leone highlights the fact that the international community has no clear pathways 
for transforming a political settlement that is geared towards stability and control 
towards more inclusive state-society relations based on liberal governance and 
inclusive participation. More often than not, the activities of international 
peacebuilders around political settlement have contributed to an order where 
coercion, inequality and violence remain central. 
To mitigate the growing intensity and frequency of violence in Sierra Leone, 
international donors and the Government of Sierra Leone should: 
1. focus on the proliferation of small arms by: investing in programmes to develop 
the capacity to control and limit the possession, trading and use of small arms; and 
developing alternative livelihood initiatives as incentives for artisan blacksmiths to 
stop producing small arms;
2. enforce codes of practice for resource extraction (such as the Extractives Industries 
Transparency Initiative), make multinational corporations (MNCs) operating in Sierra 
Leone accountable for their business ethics and support the creation of domestic 
natural resource-governance initiatives with a view to promoting transparency, 
accountability and fair use and allocation of proceeds from natural resources;
3. emphasise, as a key priority for their poverty-reduction strategies, the reintegration 
into economic and social life of demobilised militants in peri-urban and rural areas, 
with a particular focus on job creation and vocational training for youth.
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